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Abstract 
In this paper we derive the correct solution of optimal closure of the state sector studied in 
Section 6.4 of Aghion and Blanchard (1994). Aghion and Blanchard only present an 
'approximate' solution which entails a constant unemployment rate in what they call a 
turnpike approximation. We show that optimal unemployment paths have two features. First, 
unemployment is increasing up to a certain point in time, when, second, the remaining 
inefficient state sector is closed down. At that point in time, which we may define as the end 
of transition, unemployment is discontinuous. The approximate solution presented by Aghion 
and Blanchard is thus found to lead to welfare losses compared to the optimal policy. In 
particular, the unemployment rate corresponding to the solution presented in Aghion and 
Blanchard is too low. Our solution is formally based on transforming the dynamic 
optimization problem to a scrap value problem with free terminal time. 
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1 Introduction
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) is an early, important contribution to the liter-
ature on economic transition from centrally planned to market economies. In
their Section 6.4 they present a dynamic optimization model to determine the
optimal speed of transition and the resultant optimal unemployment rate (see
also the description in Roland, 2000). The solid microeconomic foundations
of this dynamic model make it a valuable tool for analyzing optimal macro-
behavior of a transition economy.
When solving the dynamic optimization problem, Aghion and Blanchard
do not, in fact, derive the exact solution but only an ‘approximate’ solution,
which neglects the behavior of the economy after the state sector has been
closed down, see in particular their footnote 33 on p. 305. We derive in this
note the correct solution to the dynamic optimization problem and show that
the optimal path has several interesting features that have not been noticed by
Aghion and Blanchard. It turns out that a proper analysis of the model gives
rise to richer dynamics than might be expected when resorting to what Aghion
and Blanchard label ‘turnpike’ approximation.
We show that (correct) optimal paths have the following properties: Up
to a certain point in time, say τ , the government assumes an active role on
the labor market by shrinking the inefficient state sector. This is done at an
increasing rate, hence the optimal unemployment rate is not constant. At τ the
government closes down the (remaining) inefficient state sector and does not
intervene in the labor market any further. Hence, at τ the unemployment rate
jumps and from there on gradually moves towards zero. Thus, in this model we
may define the end of transition as τ , where the remaining state sector is closed
down in a discontinuous fashion. It holds that τ is endogenous and has to be
chosen optimally by the government. Further, it holds that the correct optimal
unemployment rate is larger than the rate proposed by Aghion and Blanchard
over the transition period. Thus, the path obtained by Aghion and Blanchard
leads to welfare losses.
The result presented here may perhaps be best understood by noticing that
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the problem is formally similar to the problem of extracting an exhaustible re-
source. The stock of individuals employed in the state sector is the resource that
can be ‘mined’. The difference to the resource problem lies in that the process of
mining a resource yields profits that represent instantaneous benefits, whereas
in the present model, mining (i.e. unemployment) is costly. This explains why
models of exhaustible resources predict that resources should be mined at a de-
creasing rate whereas the present model prescribes that unemployment should
increase over the interval [0, τ).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we set up and analyze the
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model in detail and Section 3 briefly concludes.
2 The Model and the Solution of Aghion and Blan-
chard
We restrict the description of the model on the dynamic optimization problem
presented in Section 6.4 of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and discuss only those
parts of the analysis presented in their paper in detail that are immediately
relevant here.
Denote with E(t) the number of people employed in the state sector (with
constant marginal productivity x), with N(t) the number of people employed in
the emerging private sector (with constant marginal productivity y) and with
U(t) the number of unemployed people at time t. Population is normalized to
one, i.e. E(t)+N(t)+U(t) = 1. At the outset of transition, employment in the
state sector drops from 1 to E(0) < 1. Aghion and Blanchard (1994) develop
an efficiency-wage based explanation for costly labor adjustment between the
old state and the new private sector. In particular, they derive the following
relationship for the speed of job creation in the new private sector (developed
in equation (9) on page 298):1
N˙ = f(U) = a
[
U
U + ca
] [
y − rc−
(
b
1− U
)]
(1)
with a, b, c and r constants. The cost of job creation in the private sector is
given by 12ar (f(U))
2. The state sector declines over time and the government
1To avoid overloaded notation we sometimes skip the time index t.
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chooses the speed of closure and hence of unemployment.
The government is only concerned with efficiency and chooses employment
in the state sector2 to maximize the present discounted value of output. This
optimization problem is given by:
max
E(t)
∫ ∞
0
[
E(t)x+N(t)y − 1
2ar
f (U(t))2
]
e−rtdt (2)
subject to:
N˙(t) = f(U(t)) (3)
N(0) = 0 (4)
E(t) +N(t) + U(t) = 1 (5)
and non-negativity of E(t), N(t) and U(t).
Based on the relation that E(t)+N(t)+U(t) = 1, one immediately observes
that the problem can equivalently be formulated by using U(t) as the control
and by eliminating E(t), which leaves us with only U(t) and N(t) in both the
objective function and the constraints.3 This formulation of the problem is
given by:
max
U∈[0,1]
∫ ∞
0
[
(1−N(t)− U(t))x+N(t)y − 1
2ar
f (U(t))2
]
e−rtdt (6)
subject to:
N˙(t) = f(U(t)) (7)
N(t) ∈ [0, 1] (8)
N(t) + U(t) ≤ 1 (9)
Note first that an optimal path may have one of the following properties: There
exists a τ < ∞ such that τ = inft≥0(N(t) + U(t) = 1) or condition (9) is not
binding for any finite t. These two cases will be discussed separately below.
Before doing so, an important property of the model is derived in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Along any path it holds that N(t) < 1 for all t <∞.
2See below that this is equivalent to choosing unemployment.
3We perform this substitution to have U , postulated to be constant along optimal paths
by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), as the control variable.
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Proof : For values of N(t) sufficiently close to 1, the largest possible value of
N˙(t) is given by setting U(t) = 1 − N(t). The ordinary differential equation
N˙(t) = f(1−N(t)) has a stable steady state at N = 1, hence N(t) approaches
1 only asymptotically. ¤
An additional problem with the model is that that the Hamiltonian may
have two local maxima with respect to U . However, this problem can easily be
dispensed with: If Û is the larger of these two maxima, then it is easy to show
that there is some value U˜ < Û such that f
(
U˜
)
= f
(
Û
)
. If this is the case,
then U˜ leads to the same rate of job creation at a lesser cost, so Û cannot be
optimal. Hence, we can disregard the possibility of two local maxima of the
Hamiltonian in the sequel.
Let us now turn to study the possible optimal paths in detail. We start with
the case that the constraint (9) becomes binding for the first time at some point
τ <∞. Given that state sector employment is monotonically non-increasing, it
follows that for t ≥ τ the control problem has a trivial optimal solution. Denote
with N(t,Nτ ) the solution to the differential equation N˙(t) = f(1−N(t)) solved
over (τ,∞) with initial condition N(τ) = Nτ . Note that it trivially holds that
∂N(τ,Nτ )
∂Nτ
= 1. Also note that up to now both τ and Nτ are unspecified.
The objective function of the optimization problem from τ onwards is given
by:
V (τ,Nτ ) =
∫ ∞
τ
[
N (t,Nτ ) y − 12arf (1−N (t,Nτ ))
2
]
e−rtdt (10)
Note the following relationships for the partial derivatives of the objective func-
tion (10):
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂τ
= −
[
N (t,Nτ ) y − 12arf (1−N (t,Nτ ))
2
]
e−rτ (11)
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂Nτ
=
∞∫
τ
[
y +
1
ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ )) f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ ))
]
e−rtdt
=
y
r
e−rτ +
∞∫
τ
[
1
ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ )) f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ ))
]
e−rtdt (12)
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Now the optimization problem corresponding to the case considered can be
rewritten as a scrap value problem with free terminal time, i.e. τ is to be chosen
optimally as well:
max
U∈[0,1],τ∈[0,∞)
 τ∫
0
[
(1−N − U)x+Ny − 1
2ar
f (U)2
]
e−rtdt+ V (τ,N (τ))

(13)
subject to (7), (8) and (9).
Problems of this type are studied in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, The-
orem 3 and Note 2, p. 182–184) where necessary conditions for optimality
are presented. The Hamiltonian corresponding to this problem is given by
H = (1−N −U)x+Ny− 12arf(U)2+µf(U), where we ignore, for brevity, the
other constraints (8) and (9) and the associated multipliers. It is straightfor-
ward but cumbersome to present the solution including these additional terms
in the Hamiltonian. It can be shown that these constraints will not be binding,
except possibly at t = 0 and t =∞.4
Necessary conditions for optimality are given by:
−x− 1
ar
f (U) f ′ (U) + µf ′ (U) = 0 (14)
µ˙ = rµ+ x− y (15)
Furthermore, the following transversality condition has to hold:
µ (τ) e−rτ =
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂Nτ
(16)
The optimal terminal time τ is found from:
He−rτ +
∂V (τ,Nτ )
∂τ
= 0 (17)
Equation (15) gives the following solution for µ(t):
µ(t) =
y − x
r
+Kert (18)
Here K is a constant whose value has to be determined from the transversality
condition (16).
4In fact, it can be shown that the only possible case where any other constraint than
U(t) +N(t) ≤ 1 is binding for t <∞ is the case where U (0) = 1, in which case τ = 0.
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Remark 1 The solution proposed by Aghion and Blanchard (1994) is derived
from the above differential equation (18) by setting K = 0. This implies a
constant value of the costate variable µ(t) ≡ y−xr and thus a constant unem-
ployment rate. Inserting µ = y−xr in equation (14) leads to the solution proposed
by Aghion and Blanchard (1994), see their equation (26) on p. 309.
As noted in Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and also mentioned in the in-
troduction, this cannot be the correct solution for all values of t, since due to
private sector job creation (which happens at a constant rate for constant unem-
ployment) at some point the unemployment rate has to decline. We show below,
however, that even before the end of transition, the optimal unemployment rate
is not constant.
Let us next determine K, or to be more precise, let us determine whether
it is equal to 0 or not for optimal paths. This can be achieved by inserting (18)
and (12) into the transversality condition (16). After some rearrangements this
yields:
Kerτ =
x
r
+
∞∫
τ
[
1
ar
f (1−N (t,Nτ )) f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ ))
]
e−r(t−τ)dt (19)
In order to sign K, we need to sign the last term in the square brackets in this
equation. The following proposition is helpful.
Proposition 2 Along an optimal path, f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t.
Proof: First, note that for any choice of τ and Nτ there is a segment [τ + d,∞)
such that f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ )) = f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t ∈ [τ + d,∞). This is a
straightforward implication of U (t) becoming small as N (t) goes to 1. In par-
ticular, this implies that paths where f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t are always feasible
if U (t) is chosen to be small enough. Second, note that for every Û such that
f ′
(
Û
)
< 0, there is a value U˜ < Û such that f
(
U˜
)
= f
(
Û
)
and f ′
(
U˜
)
> 0.
Since U˜ and Û give the same rate of job creation, but higher values of U are
more costly, it follows that for the optimal choice of U it will always hold that
f ′ (U (t)) > 0. Taken together these two facts imply that it is always possible to
choose paths such that f ′ (U (t)) > 0 for all t and it is never optimal to choose
6
U N+ =1
U
N1
1
U( )t
lim ( )t U t®t­
{Jump in ( ) atend of transitionU t
Solution path proposed by
Aghion and Blanchard
Figure 1: Illustration of optimal path of the unemployment rate, which is mono-
tonically increasing until τ , where it jumps to 1−N(τ) to gradually decline to
0 afterwards. The figure also displays the unemployment rate corresponding to
the solution proposed by Aghion and Blanchard, which is constant at a lower
unemployment rate.
any other paths. Thus, the proposition follows. ¤
Proposition 2 implies that the second term on the right hand side of (19),
f ′ (1−N (t,Nτ )), is positive and hence, the right hand side is positive. Conse-
quently, it follows that K is positive. This implies that µ(t) is not constant over
time and thus the optimal unemployment rate is also not constant over time. In
fact it follows that the optimal unemployment rate is increasing over time until
τ , which is to be determined from equation (17). The fact that K > 0 implies
that µ(t) is larger than y−xr for all t < τ . This implies that U(t) correspond-
ing to the optimal solution is larger than derived in Aghion and Blanchard.
Consequently it follows that the transition period is shorter than suggested by
Aghion and Blanchard.
There is another interesting feature: The optimal unemployment rate is
discontinuous at time τ and hence the optimal path for the unemployment rate
is as illustrated in Figure 1. Let us now derive the result illustrated in Figure 1
analytically.
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Proposition 3 For an optimal path of the unemployment rate it holds that
lim
t→τ−
U(t) < 1−N(t). This implies that U (t) is discontinuous at τ .
Proof: The proof is by contradiction, therefore assume that lim
t→τ−
U(t) =
1 − N(t). Then equation (17) implies that µ(τ)f(1 − N(τ)) = 0. This in
turn implies, since N(τ) < 1 (which follows from Proposition 1), that µ(τ) = 0.
Then equation (18) implies that K < 0, since y > x by assumption. However,
K < 0 is in contradiction with (19). This shows the proposition. ¤
To complete our analysis it remains to be shown that the second case, where
condition (9) does not become binding for any finite t, cannot lead to optimal
paths. Note first that, also in this case, K 6= 0, because K = 0 implies a
constant unemployment rate (compare Remark 1). This follows from insert-
ing (18) in (14), which now have to hold for all t ≥ 0 for optimal paths. Since
a constant unemployment rate implies a constant job creation rate, eventually
the unemployment rate has to decrease because of constant population size.
Thus, K 6= 0. This implies that µ(t) diverges to either plus or minus infinity,
depending upon the sign of K. However, such a path of µ(t) cannot fulfill the
necessary condition (14) for all t ≥ 0, since both f(U) and f ′(U) are bounded.
This shows that indeed such paths cannot be optimal.
3 Conclusions
In this note we have studied the optimal solution for the dynamic optimization
problem concerning the optimal speed of transition introduced in Aghion and
Blanchard (1994, Section 6.4).
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) mention in footnote 33 of their paper that
their solution is a ‘turnpike’ approximation to the solution and they obtain
a constant optimal unemployment rate over time, implicitly assumed to hold
until the state sector is shut down entirely. Neither how nor when that hap-
pens exactly is discussed in Aghion and Blanchard (1994). These questions are
addressed here by transforming the dynamic optimization problem in a scrap
value problem with free terminal time.
8
In this note we have discussed correct optimal unemployment paths, which
have been found to differ in two respects from the partial solution presented
in Aghion and Blanchard (1994). First, the optimal unemployment rate is
increasing over time until, second, the state sector is shut down entirely at
a certain point in time. This leads to a discontinuity in the unemployment
rate at this point in time. The point in time where the government closes the
inefficient remaining state sector entirely can be defined as the end of transition.
Afterwards the government does not assume an active role in the labor market.
Finally also note that the path with constant unemployment rate as found
in Aghion and Blanchard (1994) leads to welfare losses since a constant unem-
ployment rate (until the end of transition) is not optimal. The non-constancy of
the optimal unemployment rate is a similarity to the solutions typically found
for exhaustible resource extraction problems. As discussed in the introduction
such problems are equivalent to the problem of closing an inefficient state sec-
tor. We speculate, based on this observation, that the transition literature may
borrow further insights from resource economics. Since transition is still ongo-
ing or about to start in countries around the world, this may be a relevant line
of research.
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